Artificial Intelligence Enabled Viral Weapons of Mass Destruction, A Critical Perspective on The Current Landscape of Nucleic Screening, AI Agents, and Implementing the National Artificial Intelligence Action Plan

Authors

  • Stefan Thottunkal Department of Medicine, Stanford University School of Medicine, Palo Alto, CA 94305, USA

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.31646/gbio.376

Abstract

The current trajectory of synthetic biology and AI development, while promising significant societal benefits, is simultaneously creating critical biosecurity vulnerabilities that our current tools and governance structures are ill-equipped to handle. This paper highlights gaps surrounding viral weapons of mass destruction (VWMDs), and provides an overview of key policy, technical, and regulatory barriers.

Currently, there is a lack of enforced regulations to effectively screen customers purchasing biosynthetic products, and a vulnerability within existing screening processes to adversarial exploitation. At the same time, global governance and policy frameworks have poor oversight over private companies and a lack of incentives to promote biosafety. We suggest a strategic, top-down approach that focuses on developing effective screening tools and pragmatic customer screening policies. We put forward key considerations and opportunities for the EO’s upcoming AI Action Plan to address current gaps.

Published

2026-06-30

How to Cite

Thottunkal, S. (2026). Artificial Intelligence Enabled Viral Weapons of Mass Destruction, A Critical Perspective on The Current Landscape of Nucleic Screening, AI Agents, and Implementing the National Artificial Intelligence Action Plan. Global Biosecurity, 8(88). https://doi.org/10.31646/gbio.376

Issue

Section

Editorials and Commentaries
Received 2026-05-23
Accepted 2026-06-08
Published 2026-06-30