Introduction

The recent increase in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) risks has necessitated greater attention from national and international systems concerned with public and community safety, health, and disaster management (Javan Biparva et al., 2026; Ranse et al., 2025). CBRN threats attract attention not only because of their significant impacts on public health and the environment but also due to their multi-sectoral nature (Narimani et al., 2025; Harefa et al., 2026). These threats involve complex management processes that require coordinated intervention by interdisciplinary institutions (Farhat et al., 2024; Vengidasamy et al., 2024; Ahmad and Qzih, 2025). Current research in the field of CBRN underscores the need for multidimensional approaches to risk assessment (Malizia et al., 2025). At the international level, various frameworks addressing the different dimensions of CBRN incidents have been developed (Amin et al., 2024). Studies in the literature emphasize the importance of decision-making mechanisms for preparedness against CBRN incidents through multidisciplinary and coordinated approaches (Coleman et al., 2019). While the International Health Regulations (IHR) focus on areas such as surveillance, early warning systems, and public health, NATO places greater emphasis on security, preparedness, and command-and-control parameters (Chattu et al., 2024; Maisaia et al., 2024). The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction prioritizes risk reduction, preparedness, and hazard concepts in its CBRN approach (Busayo et al., 2020; Wright et al., 2020). In contrast, while the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) focuses on various technical standards in the radiological and nuclear fields, the European Agreement concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road (ADR) regulates the safe transport of hazardous materials (Jaloliddin, 2026; Rabiej and Kociemba, 2025). In this context, Türkiye has developed a comprehensive legal framework and institutional structure covering the various components of CBRN risks (Ogur and Canturk, 2022). A review of the existing literature indicates that CBRN risk management is primarily addressed in terms of specific risk types, sectors, or operational capabilities. These studies make significant contributions, particularly by focusing on health systems, disaster response, or security aspects. However, it is evident that there is a limited number of studies that examine CBRN management at the national legislative level and in comparison with international frameworks, in a manner that encompasses multiple risk components. In this context, there is a clear gap in the literature regarding the comprehensive governance structure and regulatory-based institutional alignment of CBRN management, and this study aims to address that gap. This study aims to analyze Türkiye’s capacity to manage CBRN incidents within the framework of relevant national legislation and to examine the compatibility of this framework with key international frameworks such as the IHR, NATO, Sendai, IAEA, and ADR. Adopting a comparative and analytical approach, the study aims to identify the system’s strengths and areas requiring improvement. The study’s central argument is that, despite Türkiye possessing a high level of technical and sectoral capacity in the CBRN field, this capacity is not organized within an integrated governance model or a clearly defined command and control system. In this context, the study contributes to the literature by presenting a comprehensive analytical framework that addresses the fields of health, security, disaster management, nuclear safety, and transportation in an integrated manner. This study addresses the following research question. How effectively does Türkiye’s CBRN governance align with international frameworks in terms of capacity and integration?

Methods

Research Design and Data Sources

This study employs a qualitative document analysis method. Document analysis is a research approach based on the systematic examination of official documents (Bowen, 2009). The data sources of the study consist of legislation currently in force in Türkiye concerning the CBRN field, as well as the national plans of relevant institutions (Table 2). The legislation examined was selected based on criteria such as covering at least one component of CBRN risks, being legally binding at the national level, and defining institutional responsibilities. Documents falling outside this scope and lacking direct relevance to CBRN were excluded. During the analysis process, the purpose and scope sections of the legislative texts, the types of risks they address, the responsible institutions, and the fundamental functions of the regulations were taken into consideration. Furthermore, the evaluation was not limited to a descriptive level; the role of the regulations within CBRN management and their compatibility with one another were also examined. In this study, the International Health Regulations (IHR), NATO’s CBRN approach, the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) standards, and the ADR agreement were used not only as references but also as an analytical framework (World Health Organization, 2025; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2022; United Nations, 2015; International Atomic Energy Agency, 2014; United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, 2022). The level of compliance of the legislation was assessed in accordance with criteria derived from these frameworks.

Data Analysis and Coding Process

Data analysis was conducted using a deductive coding approach based on themes derived from international frameworks (Braun and Clarke, 2006). Accordingly, organizational structure, technical capacity, command and control, coordination, risk management, and system integration were identified as the primary categories of analysis. Using the coding matrix developed prior to the analysis, each legal document was evaluated according to six categories (organizational structure, technical capacity, command and control, coordination, risk management, and system integration). These categories were addressed based on indicators derived from and defined by international frameworks. The selected legislative texts were systematically reviewed in Excel and coded according to these categories. The categories identified during the coding process were applied consistently, and the integrity of the analysis was maintained. This approach enabled the study to move beyond a purely descriptive examination and provide a comparative and analytical assessment (Elo and Kyngäs, 2008). Since the coding process was conducted by a single researcher, one of the study’s limitations is that inter-coder reliability could not be assessed. Additionally, the study is based solely on legislative texts and does not encompass institutional practices at the implementation level. To present the analysis findings in a comparative manner, the evaluation in Table 1 was conducted by considering the scope of the examined legislation, the responsible institutions, and the functional roles of the regulations. Compliance levels were determined by considering the extent to which framework requirements were reflected in the legislation, together with the presence of institutional responsibilities, enforcement mechanisms, coordination arrangements, and system integration.

Findings

The findings presented in Table 2 indicate that legislation concerning CBRN management in Türkiye is well developed on a sectoral basis but lacks a comprehensive framework. While a more pronounced institutional structure exists in the areas of biological and chemical risks, the limited integration between these areas is noteworthy. These findings further suggest that while biological and chemical domains demonstrate relatively stronger institutionalization, the lack of integration between sectors limits overall system coherence and reduces the effectiveness of CBRN governance.

The study evaluated requirements derived from international frameworks, including the clarity of institutional responsibilities, the existence of enforcement mechanisms, system integration, functional alignment with international frameworks, and the scope of the legislation. The inclusion of the vast majority of these requirements in the legislation, together with clearly defined institutional responsibilities and enforcement mechanisms, was classified as high-level compliance(>75%).

The presence of specific shortcomings related to implementation, coordination, or institutional integration was classified as moderate compliance (40–75%), whereas situations in which institutional responsibilities and implementation or coordination mechanisms were highly limited or inadequate were classified as low compliance (<40%).

Figure 1 illustrates the institutional components of CBRN management in Türkiye and the inter-agency relationships. At the center of this structure is the Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD), while various ministries and agencies contribute to the system within their respective areas of responsibility. It is evident that areas such as public health, nuclear safety, chemical risk management, and hazardous materials transportation are organized under distinct institutional frameworks.

Discussion

The findings of this study indicate that CBRN management in Türkiye possesses a high level of technical and institutional capacity in certain areas; however, this capacity is not integrated into a comprehensive management model (Table 2). A general review of the legislation reveals that regulations addressing different types of risks are well developed within their respective domains, but cooperation among these regulations remains limited. The findings align with studies highlighting that limited inter-agency coordination in CBRN management negatively affects system effectiveness. This situation indicates that existing resources have not yet been integrated into a cohesive framework. First, from the perspective of biological risk management, Türkiye demonstrates a strong infrastructure in terms of surveillance and early warning systems (Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye, 2018). This finding is consistent with studies emphasizing the strength of such systems while also noting that their integration with other risk areas remains limited. This public health-based framework effectively supports data generation, monitoring, and intervention processes and demonstrates a high level of compliance with the International Health Regulations (IHR). However, the institutional linkage between these resources and other CBRN components remains limited (Table 3). This suggests that, as biological risks are often associated with chemical, radiological, or security dimensions, coordination challenges may arise in field-level management during exposure incidents. It should be noted that, despite the presence of a robust technical infrastructure, a lack of integration remains a significant factor limiting system performance.

Indeed, the literature emphasizes that managing coexisting risks is complicated by organizational structures and insufficient coordination (Boin et al., 2020). Similarly, other studies indicate that multisectoral collaboration in CBRN management has not yet achieved a fully integrated structure (Harefa et al., 2026). Some research further suggests that, due to the inherent complexity of CBRN threats, management approaches may be insufficient, and coordination issues may reduce the effectiveness of interventions (Narimani et al., 2025). In the radiological and nuclear sectors, Türkiye stands out as having one of the most developed areas of technical capacity according to the relevant legislation. It is evident that legislation concerning nuclear and radiation safety is largely aligned with international standards and provides a robust framework, particularly in terms of oversight, risk control, and safety. However, this sector has developed within a relatively separate structure, maintaining only limited connections with other CBRN components. From the perspective of system integrity, weak interaction with other risk areas may lead to certain disconnects. This observation is consistent with studies highlighting implementation and integration challenges in the nuclear and radiological sectors despite strong regulatory frameworks (Putra et al., 2025). In terms of chemical risk management, legislative efforts—such as the regulation of chemical substances, the transport of hazardous materials, and the prevention of industrial accidents—establish a strong framework focused on risk reduction. This finding aligns with the literature indicating that chemical risk management is largely centered on preventive and technical regulations, while crisis management and response dimensions remain more limited; overall, it is assessed to be largely aligned with the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (United Nations, 2015). However, the strong emphasis on preventive and technical aspects results in a limited connection with crisis management and response processes. In this context, a potential disconnect between risk reduction and crisis management may complicate the functioning of CBRN management. This is consistent with studies indicating that, despite the existence of preparedness plans, implementation, training, and response capacity may remain limited, and that deficiencies in crisis management and inter-agency cooperation negatively affect system effectiveness (Baikmohammadi et al., 2024; Alahmari and Khan, 2023). From the perspective of disaster management, Türkiye has a robust institutional infrastructure in terms of legislation (Grand National Assembly of Türkiye, 2009; AFAD, 2022). AFAD legislation and the Türkiye Disaster Response Plan establish a multidisciplinary coordination structure and support operational capacity by clearly defining task distribution. However, although this structure reflects overall strength in disaster management, it does not sufficiently address the need for a continuous and centralized command-and-control mechanism specifically for CBRN incidents. Despite the emphasis on coordination in the relevant legislation, a permanent and hierarchical command-and-control structure has not been fully institutionalized. This situation may pose a risk of fragmented decision-making processes, particularly in multi-actor and high-uncertainty CBRN incidents. In this regard, the study is consistent with previous research indicating that CBRN incident management presents practical challenges due to its multi-stakeholder nature and the need for strong coordination, and that seamless inter-agency coordination is essential for an effective response (Ersoy Yalçın, 2025). At the core of the study, it becomes evident that CBRN management in Türkiye has developed within the framework of a “high technical capacity–low integration” paradigm. This finding is supported by recent studies that emphasize the need for coordination and preparedness strategies in response to current biological threats or bioterrorism scenarios (Ludovici et al., 2025). Previous studies similarly indicate that technical capabilities alone are insufficient and that institutional integration and inter-agency coordination are critical components of effective CBRN governance (Sarjito, 2025; Rietveld, 2025). When compared with international frameworks, Türkiye demonstrates a high level of compliance with relevant standards in many areas; however, this compliance is not uniformly distributed. Public health efforts aligned with the IHR are strong; risk reduction and preparedness mechanisms are developed in accordance with the Sendai Framework; the nuclear safety sector demonstrates technical adequacy within the framework of IAEA standards; and the transport of hazardous materials under the ADR is fully aligned with international norms. However, an integrated command-and-control-based management model has not been fully institutionalized in Türkiye. Overall, CBRN management in Türkiye exhibits a strong yet fragmented structure. In this context, there is a need for institutional restructuring that goes beyond technical capacity to strengthen the system. Enhancing inter-agency integration, clarifying command-and-control mechanisms, and unifying different risk areas under a common governance framework are critical for achieving greater alignment with international standards. In this context, the study demonstrates that CBRN governance should be evaluated not only in terms of technical capacity but also in relation to how this capacity is coordinated and integrated within the system. Furthermore, this study contributes to the literature by addressing CBRN governance within a comprehensive legislative framework and by presenting an analytical model that explains governance through the structural relationship between capacity and integration. Although Türkiye demonstrates substantial legislative alignment and sector-specific institutional capacities, the existence of legal frameworks and formally assigned responsibilities should not be interpreted as direct evidence of operational effectiveness during real CBRN incidents. Operational performance depends on additional factors, including inter-agency exercises, workforce competencies, communication systems, resource mobilization capacities, and field-level interoperability. Therefore, the findings of this study should be interpreted as an assessment of legislative and governance preparedness rather than actual response performance. The establishment of a dedicated CBRN coordination center in Türkiye which would ensure coordination through a multidisciplinary approach managed from a single hub, the adoption of a CBRN specific incident command system, the conduct of multisectoral exercises using various communication platforms, and the development of a national CBRN policy that defines all responsibilities could strengthen CBRN management.

Research limitations and implications

This study has certain limitations. The analysis is limited to legislative documents and therefore may not fully capture implementation practices or institutional functioning in real-world settings. In addition, the coding process was carried out by a single researcher, which restricts the assessment of coding reliability. The study is also confined to selected international frameworks, and the inclusion of additional frameworks could offer a broader perspective. In addition to all of this, this study did not address field observations, exercise reports, or existing operational performance metrics. Therefore, it is not possible to assess response capabilities in the event of an actual CBRN incident. Future studies should employ mixed-method designs combining document analysis with expert interviews, Delphi studies, simulation exercises, and empirical preparedness assessments. This study benefited from AI-based tools during the translation and language editing processes.

Conclusion

This study demonstrates that CBRN management in Türkiye is based on strong technical and institutional capacity and exhibits a high level of compliance across most of the areas examined; however, it is not sufficiently organized within an integrated management structure. While substantial alignment with international standards has been achieved in the areas of public health, nuclear safety, chemical risk management, and disaster response, this alignment is not uniformly reflected across the entire system. The absence of a fully institutionalized model based on an integrated command-and-control structure and effective civil–military coordination may pose a risk from a management perspective. This finding highlights that the relationship between capacity and integration is a critical factor in CBRN management. Accordingly, strengthening CBRN governance requires not only enhancing technical capacity but also improving inter-agency coordination, clarifying command-and-control mechanisms, and integrating different risk areas under a unified governance framework. Future CBRN management models must go beyond sector-specific capabilities and adopt integrated, command-and-control-focused management structures that combine technical expertise with organizational interoperability and resilience.

About the authors

Ali Sert is a lecturer at Burdur Mehmet Akif Ersoy University and holds a PhD in CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear) defence. His research focuses on disaster risk governance, public health preparedness, and institutional coordination in multi-risk environments. In addition, his work includes the development of new risk models in the CBRN field, as well as CBRN disaster analysis and risk mapping methodologies. His research particularly examines the legislative and organizational dimensions of CBRN management and its alignment with international frameworks.

Ethics and Consent to Participate

Ethical approval was not required because this study was based exclusively on publicly available legislative texts, policy documents, and institutional regulations

Consent for Publication

Not applicable

Competing interests

The author declares that he has no competing interests.

Funding

The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Authors' contributions

AS conceived and designed the study, conducted the document analysis, developed the coding framework, interpreted the findings, drafted and revised the manuscript, and approved the final version.

Data Accessibility Statement

All data analysed in this study are based on publicly available legislation, regulations, institutional documents, and international frameworks. The sources used in the analysis are listed in the references and tables. No additional dataset was generated.

Acknowledgements

The author acknowledges Burdur Mehmet Akif Ersoy University for its institutional support and academic environment, which facilitated the conduct of this study. The author used an artificial intelligence-based language editing tool to improve the grammar, spelling, and readability of the manuscript

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