Lyndall Sims, Atalay Goshu Muluneh, Samsung Lim, Aye Moa, Ashley Quigly, C Raina MacIntyre
Veterinary laboratories are necessary to maintain animal health and store zoonotic infections safely, but they can present challenges for biosafety and biosecurity. Historical evidence shows that veterinary laboratory accidents have affected thousands of people. The lack of geolocation data on these laboratories and the pathogens they handle is a bottleneck in zoonotic disease surveillance and detection of veterinary laboratory accidents. Therefore, mapping the locations of veterinary laboratories will enhance the ability to detect outbreaks or potential laboratory leaks of veterinary pathogens.
Keywords: Veterinary laboratory, infectious disease surveillance, mapping
The majority (61%) of emerging infectious diseases in humans have a zoonotic origin (1). Traditionally, infectious disease epidemics are identified through indicator-based surveillance data reported by healthcare providers, hospitals, and laboratories. However, there is a time lag between symptom onset and disease confirmation. Syndromic surveillance, which uses symptoms before confirmation, can bridge this gap (2). Complementing syndromic surveillance with open-source intelligence could bring better early warning signals to detect infectious disease outbreaks (3, 4). It facilitates early intervention in exponential growth, thus averting an epidemic or pandemic and reducing disease-associated mortality and morbidity, complementing traditional public health surveillance (2). Some zoonotic pathogens, such as avian influenza, anthrax, brucellosis, and Crimean Congo haemorrhagic fever, are highly contagious and potentially fatal to humans.
Veterinary laboratories have played a crucial role in vaccine production, drug development, diagnosis, research, and the storage of zoonotic pathogens (5, 6). They have also contributed to preventing and controlling infectious disease epidemics in humans. For instance, during the COVID-19 pandemic in the United States, the government mobilised veterinary diagnostic laboratories to support human COVID-19 testing (7). In response, seven veterinary laboratories in the animal health laboratory network participated in conducting COVID-19 testing for humans (8).
Laboratory leaks have and will continue to occur despite adherence to strict containment protocols (9). Brucellosis, a zoonotic disease, is the most commonly reported laboratory-acquired infection in humans worldwide (10). A 2019 brucellosis leak from a veterinary pharmaceutical company in Gansu, China, infected more than 10,500 people (11) and is considered one of the largest veterinary laboratory leak-related outbreaks in history. COVID-19 is also one of the ongoing pandemics speculated as a laboratory leak from China, where researchers were working on bat coronavirus research (12). Other laboratory leaks have also been recorded in different countries (13). In 2007, a laboratory leak of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) occurred at the Pirbright Institute in the United Kingdom. This was attributed to the old, leaking pipes carrying viral effluent for decontamination and the subsequent off-site transportation of the FMD virus by muddy vehicles. Consequently, the herds of several local farmers were mandatorily slaughtered (14, 15).
Anthrax is listed as a zoonotic category A bioweapon agent, having the potential to cause a severe threat to human and animal health (16), has a long history of laboratory-related incidents, and use in bioweapons research (14). This is from the 2001 US anthrax deliberate release (17) MS to the Russian accidental leak that has infected hundreds of people (18).
The avian influenza is a disease associated with large outbreaks in wild aquatic birds and farmed poultry, resulting in huge economic losses for farmers. A current public health concern is the potential adaptation of the virus to enable human-to-human transmission (19). Dual-use research of concern regarding this adaptation has been reported (20). This means that leaks from veterinary laboratories working with highly pathogenic avian influenza could pose a significant public health threat, and more robust evidence is needed to detect such events early.
Globally, oversight of biosafety laboratories is fragmented (21). Oversight regulations vary between countries; for instance, Canada and the United States have different regulations. In Canada, no national legislation exists on animal welfare in research. Instead, the Canadian animal care committees are responsible for overseeing animal research in universities and agricultural organisations. In contrast, the United States has two national laws that apply to oversee animals used in research (22). Moreover, the oversight of veterinary laboratories is often neglected compared to human BSL-3 and BSL-4 laboratories.
The existence of substantial evidence of pathogen leaks from veterinary laboratories (11, 23-25), highlights the need for a more pragmatic and thorough approach to early detection. Geospatial mapping techniques, such as those used for COVID-19 outbreak mapping and early intelligence (27, 28), could be customised for mapping veterinary laboratories and risk analysis of laboratory leaks. Some high-containment veterinary laboratories are included in the mapping of BSL-4 and BSL-3+ laboratories by Global Biolabs (26). However, this mapping lacks detailed information on the locations, names, and pathogens handled within the Animal Biosafety Level 2 (ABSL-2) and 3 (ABSL-3) laboratories. Hence, implementing mapping studies, such as red-flagging techniques, could help identify signals of outbreaks or leaks near these veterinary laboratories.
Given the high risk associated with laboratory leaks, the absence of a comprehensive, publicly available list of veterinary laboratories and the pathogens they work with is a concern. Obtaining and collating this information will allow for enhanced surveillance in areas containing these laboratories and the early detection of potential laboratory leaks. Therefore, mapping veterinary laboratories that have the potential to work with high-risk pathogens could improve biosafety and related threats.
We identified veterinary laboratories using various search terms, including “Animal Biosafety laboratory/ies”, “Animal containment laboratory”, “veterinary biosafety laboratory”, “ABSL-2”,” ABSL-3”, “ABSL-4”. The latitude and longitude of each laboratory were then manually extracted from Google Maps. Finally, we mapped these veterinary laboratories using ArcGIS Pro. The preliminary mapping indicated that veterinary laboratories are concentrated in Europe and the United States, with few in Africa and the South American region (Figure 1).
Manual extraction of latitude and longitude may lack precision, and the results are based on preliminary analysis that may be interpreted with caution, as they may require further comprehensive evidence for the lists of veterinary laboratories.
Historical incidents of laboratory leaks from veterinary laboratories indicate the need for comprehensive geospatial mapping and enhanced surveillance. Expanding mapping studies of these laboratories could improve biosafety and help protect the public from laboratory-acquired epidemics or accidental leaks.
The Balvi Filantropik Fund supports the EPIWATCH@, where the first author has been working in an EPIWATCH internship. AGM is supported by the UNSW UIP scholarship.
Ethics approval was not required for this study.
There were no relevant disclosures.
Figure 1: Global mapping shows the preliminary results of the veterinary microbiology laboratories
1. Taylor LH, Latham SM, Woolhouse MEJPTotRSoLSBBS. Risk factors for human disease emergence. 2001;356(1411):983-9..
2. Henning KJ. Overview of syndromic surveillance: What is syndromic surveillance? Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report. 2004;53 (Suppl):5-11..
3. Thamtono Y, Moa A, MacIntyre CR. Using open-source intelligence to identify early signals of COVID-19 in Indonesia. Western Pacific surveillance and response journal : WPSAR. 2021;12(1):40-5.
4. Stone H, Heslop D, Lim S, Sarmiento I, Kunasekaran M, MacIntyre CR. Open-Source Intelligence for Detection of Radiological Events and Syndromes Following the Invasion of Ukraine in 2022: Observational Study. JMIR infodemiology. 2023;3:e39895.
5. Finley MR, Astuto-Gribble LM, Brass VH. Biosafety and biosecurity in veterinary laboratories. Sandia National Lab.(SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); 2016..
6. Siengsanan-Lamont J, Kamolsiripichaiporn S, Ruanchaimun S, Patchimasiri T, Jongrakwattana B, Blacksell SDJAB. Biosafety and biosecurity challenges facing veterinary diagnostic laboratories in lower-middle income countries in Southeast Asia: A case study of Thailand. 2019;24(4):220-30.
7. Nolen RS. VETERINARY LABS CONTINUE TO SUPPORT COVID-19 TESTING. AMER VETERINARY MEDICAL ASSOC 1931 N MEACHAM RD SUITE 100, SCHAUMBURG, IL …; 2020.
8. Clements N, Diel DG, Elvinger F, Koretzky G, Siler J, Warnick LDJPo. The role of veterinary diagnostic laboratories during COVID-19 response in the United States. 2024;19(6):e0303019.
9. Britton S, van den Hurk AF, Simmons RJ, Pyke AT, Northill JA, McCarthy J, McCormack J. Laboratory-acquired dengue virus infection: A case report. PLoS neglected tropical diseases. 2011;5(11):e1324.
10. Blacksell SD, Dhawan S, Kusumoto M, Le KK, Summermatter K, O’Keefe J, et al. Laboratory-acquired infections and pathogen escapes worldwide between 2000 and 2021: a scoping review. 2023.
11. Pappas G. The Lanzhou Brucella Leak: The Largest Laboratory Accident in the History of Infectious Diseases? Clinical infectious diseases : an official publication of the Infectious Diseases Society of America. 2022;75(10):1845-7.
12. Ruiz‐Medina BE, Varela‐Ramirez A, Kirken RA, Robles‐Escajeda EJB. The SARS‐CoV‐2 origin dilemma: Zoonotic transfer or laboratory leak? 2022;44(1):2100189 .
13. Miller C, Songer J, Sullivan JJAIHAJ. A twenty-five year review of laboratory-acquired human infections at the National Animal Disease Center. 1987;48(3):271-5 .
14. Manheim D, Lewis G. High-risk human-caused pathogen exposure events from 1975-2016. F1000Research. 2022;10:752 .
15. Manuel J. Oversight without obstruction: The challenge for high-containment labs. Environmental Health Perspectives. 2008;116(11):A486-A9 .
16. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, United States Department of Agriculture. Select agents and toxins list 2023, August 1 [Available from: https://www.selectagents.gov/sat/list.htm .
17. Oliveira M, Mason-Buck G, Ballard D, Branicki W, Amorim AJFsi. Biowarfare, bioterrorism and biocrime: A historical overview on microbial harmful applications. 2020;314:110366.
18. Nikolakakis I, Michaleas SN, Panayiotakopoulos G, Papaioannou TG, Karamanou M, Michaleas S, Papaioannou TJC. The History of Anthrax Weaponization in the Soviet Union. 2023;15(3) .
19. World Organisation for Animal Health. Avian influenza 2023 [Available from: https://www.woah.org/en/disease/avian-influenza/.
20. Yong E. Mutant-flu paper published. Nature. 2012;485(7396):13-4 .
21. Lowen AC, Casadevall A, Alwine JC, Enquist LW, Goodrum FD, Imperiale MJ, Lakdawala SSJJoV. Oversight of pathogen research must be carefully calibrated and clearly defined. Am Soc Microbiol; 2023. p. e00176-23 .
22. Griffin G, Locke PJiJ. Comparison of the Canadian and US laws, regulations, policies, and systems of oversight for animals in research. 2017;57(3):271-84 .
23. Manheim DB. Results of a 2020 Survey on Reporting Requirements and Practices for Biocontainment Laboratory Accidents. Health security. 2021;19(6):642-51.
24. El Jaouhari M, Striha M, Edjoc R, Bonti-Ankomah S. Laboratory-acquired infections in Canada from 2016 to 2021. Canada communicable disease report = Releve des maladies transmissibles au Canada. 2022;48(7-8):303-7 .
25. Xu C, Guo L, Wang K, Yang T, Feng Y, Wang H, et al. Current challenges of university laboratory: Characteristics of human factors and safety management system deficiencies based on accident statistics. Journal of safety research. 2023;86:318-35.